Opportunistic Neutralism Instead of Constitutional Duty? – Switzerland in Armenia
- werner vangent
- Mar 22
- 7 min read
Werner Thut, Hans-Lukas Kieser, March 2025
Opportunistic neutralism where there is a risk of conflict - or active intervention, as required by the Federal Constitution? A current example of the Swiss dilemma is Armenia. A few years ago, Bern withdrew from attempts to settle the conflict between Armenia and the neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey and limited itself to development cooperation. This too now faces cuts under fiscal austerity programs.
The article was first published by the Swiss Foreign Policy Association and is based on a scientific working paper available in German and French.
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Armenia, a small state of fewer than three million inhabitants between the Black and Caspian Seas, is under pressure. In 2020, neighboring Azerbaijan reconquered a large portion of territory that had been under Armenian control since 1994. At the end of 2023, Azerbaijan forcibly annexed Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian exclave, and continues to threaten new military action. The militarily weakened Armenian government, facing domestic political pressure, is relying on peace negotiations—though their prospects remain uncertain. Armenia's situation is precarious.
Switzerland is affected because it was actively involved in peace efforts in the early 21st century and has built significant reputational capital through its development cooperation work. Moreover, these developments call into question not only previous achievements but, ultimately, the objectives of the Federal Constitution—namely, the commitment to 'respect for human rights,' the 'promotion of democracy,' the 'peaceful coexistence of peoples,' and the 'conservation of natural resources'— in the South Caucasus.
Switzerland has maintained close ties with Armenia for at least 150 years. However, the broader context has changed fundamentally in recent times. Key factors include Armenia's security situation, the geopolitical impact of the war in Ukraine, and, in Switzerland, the expansion of the army—partly at the expense of international cooperation.
The Armenian people - victims of great power politics from 1878 to the present day
The 'Armenian question'—concerning the future of the Armenian people, who were clearly endangered in the late Ottoman Empire—became the focus of Western Middle East diplomacy at the Berlin Congress in 1878. However, no credible solution emerged. The severe massacres of the Armenian civilian population in the Ottoman Empire in 1895 prompted Switzerland to respond, leading to the largest petition ever submitted to the Federal Council in 1896, with nearly half a million signatures.
The efforts did not stop there. Civilian Armenian aid from Switzerland provided emergency relief and reconstruction assistance for decades. The churches played a significant role, as Armenia is a Christian country. From the late 19th century, Switzerland also became a hub for Armenian students from the Russian and Ottoman empires, with Geneva emerging as a center for Armenian publications and activism.
At the time, Sultan Abdulhamid II (reigning from 1876 to 1908) ruled an empire in crisis, weakened by financial instability, wars, separatism in the Balkans, and pressure from both Russia and Western powers. In response to the perceived 'Christian threat,' he adopted a policy of Islamism, promoting Sunni unity. This made Ottoman Armenians, who demanded equal rights and reforms, targets of repression. In turn, militant Armenian organizations emerged, organizing self-defense and advocating for fundamental change.
For the 1908 revolution, the Young Turks formed an alliance with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, whose foreign headquarters were in Geneva. However, the Young Turks soon shifted towards an ultranationalist Turkish-Islamic ideology. By 1913, they had established a party dictatorship. In 1914, they chose to enter World War I on the side of Germany. Although they lost the war, in its aftermath, they carried out the genocide of Armenians and other Christian minorities to 'homogenize' the multi-ethnic Anatolian heartland of the Ottoman Empire. Between 1915 and 1922, approximately 1 million Armenian men, women, and children were killed, with about half of them dying in massacres.
This 'achievement' persisted after 1918, as the new nationalist government in Ankara was largely composed of former Young Turks. In 1920, they allied with the Bolsheviks, divided the Southwest Caucasus among themselves, and won the war in Anatolia against Armenians, Kurds, and Greeks. As a result, the plans of the victorious powers and the League of Nations for an independent Armenia, which included parts of Eastern Anatolia, were rendered obsolete. The Republic of Armenia, established in 1918, eventually became a Soviet republic. Despite initial commitments, Moscow later seceded Armenian Karabakh from it. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, formalized this new status quo.
Since the end of the Soviet Union, Armenia's development has been heavily influenced by the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Following its independence in 1991, the Third Republic was established. The First Karabakh War (1992–1994) ended with Armenian forces gaining control over the region and surrounding territories. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis were displaced or fled the area. While the conflict came to a temporary halt, the unresolved territorial dispute and the war’s outcome laid the groundwork for renewed hostilities, with Azerbaijan significantly strengthening its military capabilities over time.
In 2008, the Armenian presidential elections were followed by serious unrest, marking the beginning of a more authoritarian period under President Serzh Sargsyan. In 2013, after negotiations with the European Union, Armenia ultimately chose to join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union instead of signing an Association Agreement with the EU. The 'Velvet Revolution' of 2018 led to a significant political shift, ending the dominance of the previous ruling elite and ushering in democratic reforms. Prime Minister Pashinyan introduced these reforms while seeking closer ties with Europe, though Armenia remained strategically aligned with Russia.
In the fall of 2020, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive, resulting in territorial losses for Armenia. In the fall of 2023, Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh through a military operation. The ethnic cleansing that accompanied this forced more than 100,000 people to flee to Armenia. The already strained relations with Russia deteriorated further, prompting Armenia to seek closer geopolitical ties with the West.
Switzerland's role and responsibility
What are the implications of this situation for Switzerland? Do we need to take action? And do we have options for action?
Unlike in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Armenia is no longer seen solely as a symbol of humanitarian crises, crimes against humanity, and a persecuted people in a distant Ottoman territory, far removed from the West. Since gaining independence in 1991, Armenia has maintained diplomatic relations with Switzerland. Since 2018, it is the most democratic country in the region, but this progress has also made it more vulnerable to external and internal challenges.
Switzerland thus has the opportunity to engage in line with its federal constitution’s principles. The way in which it acts depends on political decisions made in Bern, which have evolved over time. Until the mid-2010s, political relations were marked by an active bilateral policy toward Armenia, alongside regional and multilateral peace initiatives, led by then-FDFA heads Micheline Calmy-Rey and Didier Burkhalter.
When Ignazio Cassis took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2017, Federal Council policy shifted. Switzerland continues to uphold universal values and international legal norms as guiding principles. However, there has been no indication of a continued strong commitment to promoting international justice, peace, and sustainable development in the South Caucasus.
Since 2018, Switzerland’s engagement in bilateral relations with Armenia have only been maintained with minimal effort. It did not officially take a position on Armenia’s 2018 'Velvet Revolution.' In the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, Switzerland maintains an equidistant stance out of consideration for its interests vis-à-vis Azerbaijan. It has refrained from distinguishing between aggressor and victim. Instead, it calls on both parties to the conflict to uphold their obligations under international law, particularly regarding the protection of civilians.
Switzerland has also regularly offered to facilitate high-level dialogue if both sides so wished. Beyond this, however, it has not pursued independent specific initiatives in the region.
Development cooperation at the core
Development cooperation plays a different, somewhat autonomous role. It has paved the way and been at the heart of Switzerland's presence in Armenia since 1988. Since 2000, and particularly after 2020, Switzerland's focus on humanitarian aid and poverty reduction has expanded to include conflict prevention. The 2018 'Velvet Revolution' further shaped Switzerland’s development cooperation approach, shifting its focus beyond poverty reduction to supporting democratic reforms and preserving the revolution’s achievements.
As a result of its development cooperation efforts, Switzerland is now regarded as a competent, reliable, and predictable partner for long-term, effective, and population-oriented cooperation projects. This has earned Switzerland high esteem from the Armenian population, authorities, and international partners.
Today, Switzerland's policy toward Armenia is at a turning point: After political relations have lost much of their substance compared to the past, development cooperation is now also likely to decline. The main reason for this is parliamentary decisions favoring military expansion, which will likely result in reduced development funding also for Armenia. As seen in the case of Armenia, these cuts are being made at the expense of Switzerland's most important civilian contribution to global security.
The efforts of an active parliamentary group and the foreign policy committees to promote a stronger peace policy for Armenia and the region are unlikely to have a significant impact. This is due to Switzerland’s constitutional framework, which grants the Federal Council significant autonomy in shaping foreign policy. Other actors, such as churches and the Armenian diaspora in Switzerland, cannot compensate for a lack of federal action in shaping policy.
There is scope for Switzerland's foreign policy toward Armenia. At the same time, Switzerland's political and moral responsibilities have increased—as the richest country in the world, an international heavyweight in the humanitarian tradition, and a temporary member of the UN Security Council. However, Switzerland must courageously use its leeway and responsibility to credibly and comprehensively implement Article 54 of the Federal Constitution, rather than retreating into neutralist opportunism. Over the past ten years, Switzerland has only partially fulfilled this responsibility in Armenia through development cooperation, and even this commitment is now uncertain.
The authors
Werner Thut, PhD, is a former diplomat and was responsible for Switzerland’s development cooperation program in Armenia until June 2024. Prof. Dr. Hans Lukas Kieser is a historian and conducted research on the modern Middle East at the University of Newcastle/Australia until 2024, before that in Zurich.
The article is based on a longer working paper, which is available in German and French:
