Back to a Swiss Foreign Policy Priority: The South Caucasus

Werner Thut*

Short and sparse—that’s how the Federal Council’s responses have been to numerous parliamentary and foreign policy committee initiatives calling for greater support for Armenia in its defense against Azerbaijan’s military aggression since 2020. The statements remain vague or sidestep central questions. Rather than offering concrete answers, the Federal Council cites general principles of international law—applying them equally to both aggressor and victim. Meaningful measures or initiatives are not being considered.

A new study shows that this neutralist stance largely took hold when Federal Councillor Cassis took office in 2018. It contrasts sharply with the committed and proactive foreign policy of 2000 to 2015, which aligned far more closely with both the spirit and wording of Article 54 of the Federal Constitution.

With a clear majority, Parliament has now taken countermeasures and mandated the

Federal Council with the binding mandate 24.4259 organize a dialogue between

Azerbaijan and representatives of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian people within

one year. The aim is to negotiate a safe and collective return of the historically resident Armenian population. Over 100,000 people of this Armenian exclave in Azerbaijan were expelled in the fall of 2023 within a few days in an act of ethnic cleansing by Azerbaijan.

The parliamentary decision was welcomed in Armenia and by the global diaspora,

including in Switzerland, with gratitude and, in some cases, enthusiasm. But can it

truly make a difference?

At the same time, media reports indicate progress in the intensive negotiations

between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with some suggesting an imminent peace

agreement. In this context, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan repeatedly

emphasized in parliament on March 26, 2025, that the Karabakh movement for the

self-determination of the people of Artsakh should not continue. So, is the mandate

still necessary?

For the next steps, it would be more helpful to rely on facts rather than euphoria or

wishful thinking.

The parliamentary decision sends a clear political signal to the Federal Council.

However, there is no guarantee that it will acknowledge and implement it seriously.

The list of binding foreign policy mandates referred in recent years, but only partially

implemented or not implemented at all—sometimes for understandable reasons—is

long.

This could also be the fate of mandate 24.4259, which calls for dialogue involving

representatives of the de facto state of Nagorno-Karabakh, dismantled by Azerbaijan

in 2023. This is happening precisely as former representatives—now imprisoned in

Baku—are being sentenced in show trials.

Moreover, optimists and opportunists—who see turning a blind eye as the most advantageous option for Switzerland—might dismiss such efforts as superfluous.

After all, peace appears to be in sight. Or not?

Many signs indicate that Armenia will capitulate step by step rather than achieve a

lasting peace. Azerbaijan's demands are numerous and substantial: amendments to

the Armenian constitution, the withdrawal of all lawsuits before international courts—including the revocation of existing judgments—and additional territorial concessions. Azerbaijan also refuses to accept international verification mechanisms in the context of a potential peace agreement and is demanding the withdrawal of the EU monitoring mission. At the same time, war propaganda continues, and prisoners of war and other detainees from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are being sentenced in show trials. With the expulsion of the ICRC, the last protective mechanism ensuring their fair treatment has been removed.

Ultimately, there are serious omissions: The central geopolitical issue—the creation

of a transit route through the Zangezur region—is not mentioned. The legal nature of

the proposed peace agreement also remains unclear. There is constant talk of an

agreement, but not of a binding treaty with clear obligations and enforcement

mechanisms.

In other words, the conflict is still likely far from a sustainable, lasting solution under

international law. What is needed is not less but more international attention and

commitment to prevent another war with potentially catastrophic consequences for

Armenia. Multilateral solutions involving key players—especially the EU—are therefore indispensable.

Contributing to such a process will require political will and creative diplomacy from

the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rather than taking the easy route of prematurely

dismissing the mandate as unfeasible. It will also take vigilance from Parliament and

the engaged public to ensure this does not happen.

Why should Switzerland get involved in the South Caucasus? Armenia, in particular,

is a geopolitical hotspot where Russia, the EU, Turkey, and Iran pursue vastly different interests. It has also become evident that war and peace in Europe are not determined solely on the battlefields of Ukraine. Several post-communist states, including Armenia, are part and parcel of Russia’s strategic maneuvering to win the war against Ukraine and its allies. Strengthening Armenia’s ability to defend itself, along with its future prospects and stability, is therefore in Switzerland’s direct security interest. In the long run, this also helps safeguard its liberal democratic order and contributes to global stability.

Switzerland's means and opportunities include playing an active role in international

forums such as the OSCE (of which it will hold the presidency in 2026), taking a

substantial and clear stance based on international law and human rights standards

when they are disregarded, offering to participate in verification and monitoring

mechanisms, and expanding (rather than reducing) development cooperation in the

region, with a particular emphasis on strengthening regional, cross-border cooperation. However, these and other measures—whose details still need to be refined and prioritized—require political will from Federal Councillor Cassis' ministry. This is a political will that has been lacking for the past ten years. In other words, it would require a return of the South Caucasus to the foreign policy agenda as a priority.

*Werner Thut was deputy regional director of the Swiss development cooperation

program in the South Caucasus until June 2024. In this role, he was responsible for

Switzerland's development cooperation program in Armenia, where he was also Deputy Head of Mission.